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More of life under
observation
By Scott Bradner
For some reason some people
think that the Internet could be a wiretap-free zone. While that might be nice, don't hold your breath.
"Legal intercept," the
more accurate but more complex term for wiretapping by law enforcement
organizations, has been around in the telephone business since day zero but
currently the legal picture of wiretapping of Internet communications is quite
muddy.
It is arguably the case that the
major U.S. law dealing with legal intercept, the 1994 Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), does not actually provide a clear legal
foundation for wiretapping some types of Internet communications. For example, people who should
know what they are talking about have predicted that the U.S. government would
lose a test case trying to apply CALEA to voice over IP (VoIP). But that does not mean that the FBI
agrees with that analysis or will avoid asking for VoIP intercepts. Back in March, the FBI and the U.S.
Department of Justice expressed their own view in a comment they filed response
to a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) request for comment about
regulating VoIP. But, even if the
courts were to rule that CALEA does not cover VoIP and other Internet
applications I can not imagine Congress not passing a new law in very short order
in these days of anti-terror fervor that would make the authority to wiretap
unambiguous and, probably, far too easy to invoke. So I expect that any freedom
from monitoring we might think we have will be fleeting, if indeed, Internet
service providers have not been cooperating fully with surveillance requests
for quite a while now.
But a number of recent news
reports have me quite puzzled. It looks like the FBI wants to go about the
business of being big-brother in the most illogical way. The reports are that the FBI wants VoIP
service providers to be the ones to execute the surveillance. This makes very little sense. VoIP runs as just another application
over the Internet -- it's just bits
-- thus, anyone, even the bad guys, can be a VoIP provider. Does the FBI want to have to go to, and
trust, thousands of individual VoIP service providers to get the tapping
done? Additionally, the basic
architecture of VoIP is such that the packets carrying the voice do not pass
though any central server so there is no central place to monitor them. All other Internet-based applications
also are just bits over the net and anyone can set up a server. It is
illogical to approach monitoring
from the server side.
The only logical approach is to
do the monitoring in the Internet access network. (See
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-baker-slem-architecture-01.txt for an
example of how this can be done.) This is not to say that I'm fond of the idea
nor is meant to say that history has shown that all government authorities are
always trustable but it is the only logical way to do what, the laws will say,
must be done. But I fear the
alternative is laws that tell ISPs to restrict who can run servers and to put
restrictions on the permitted service architectures -- that would destroy the
Internet and hand it over to the phone companies, the folks who know how to
work in that kind of environment.
disclaimer: Harvard predates, and I fully
expect will outlast, the phone companies and has not expressed an opinion on
this topic.