




# **Telco Security**

dumb end stations secure changing with cell phones hackable signaling tones - "phone phreaks" SS7 - no built-in security & gateways hackable switches (i.e., computers) e.g., Mitnick & Greek telco caller ID spoofing

#### **Internet Start**

ARPANET 1969, www 1993 overlay network enabled by Carterphone government funded at start smart ends, dumb network Open system **RFC 791: Internet Protocol** standards, hardware & applications generally not regulated (some country exceptions) generally not responsible for customer actions sell same service to everyone

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#### End-to-End Argument (e2e)

1981 paper by Saltzer, Reed & Clark end stations know best application aware networks get in the way keep per-session state out of network network aware applications inhibit network innovation e.g. ATM enables user innovation -- "generative" far faster deployment of new technology not dependent on carrier permission

## E2E Got Us Here

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not convinced that e2e is important?
the www exists because of e2e
as do Google, iTunes, Skype, Vonage, YouTube, Facebook, ......
e2e is hard to get at a corporate desktop or residential net
except port 80 (web)
NATs abound & block some types of applications as a byproduct
firewalls are designed to block some types of applications
but e2e still exists between enterprise boundaries

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
small users: flat rate, big users: tiered no concept of long distance distance insensitive technically too hard to know destination location no settlements origin ISP keeps all but may have to buy transit service if small large ISPs do cost-shared peering governments & regulators are puzzled try to make telco regulations fit few ISPs make money even with Internet bust


#### **Internet Security**


mostly end-to-end


i.e, security is the end system's responsibility the net, itself, transports versus and hacker attacks as reliably as it transports any traffic firewalls help but often ignores the inside attacker mixed security in Internet infrastructure secure routing updates do not secure accuracy in routing updates e.g., Pakistan induced You Tube outage


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












### The View From the ITU

#### after WSIS - Secretary-General Yoshio Utsumi


"the Internet need not be one net controlled by one centre"

domestic networks are "*more efficient and* <u>economical</u>" (because much traffic is local)

"telephone networks are made up of regional, domestic networks united together in agreement with ITU framework. A similar situation may start with the Internet" - if so the ITU will be called upon to fix things (within 5 years)

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
#### Neutral Networks

#### treat all traffic the same

or all traffic of a type (e.g., all traffic identified as VoIP) network does not bias traffic to or from users based on its content, source, or destination e.g., not give its own VoIP better quality networks do not get in the way of innovation a problem if the network becomes overloaded could accept user markings to enable different handling (maybe for more money) e.g., diffserve- requires admission control (does not exist)

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innovation happens when the user does not know what they want

little innovation in mature applications - e.g. old voice low "market uncertainty" mans little innovation and little product differentiation other than cost


high "market uncertainty" means he who guesses right can win big -- e.g., iPod

we are (or should be) in a time of high market uncertainty when it comes to Internet applications - e.g., voice

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but too much imitation, too little innovation





### **VoIP** in Enterprises

phone-think still gets in the way best effort (and good enough) are not good enough security is misunderstood today VoIP security is about the same as non-IP voice i.e., not very good standards exist but not enough implementation end-to-end security is seen as a threat by regulators, by enterprise security people a perimeter firewall may be necessary but not sufficient

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